Under the Kyoto Protocol, governments agreed on and accepted CO 2 reduction targets in order to counter climate change. In Europe one of the main policy instruments to meet these reduction targets is CO 2 emission-trading (CET), which was implemented as of January 2005. In this system, companies active in specific sectors must be in the possession of CO 2 emission rights that equals the amount of CO 2 emitted. Any surplus can be sold; any deficit must be compensated for by acquiring rights. Effectively, by pricing of CO 2 emission the external effects are partly internalized to the economy. By limiting the total amount of rights -the cap -the EU and its Members States must make sure a suitable price of rights is formed and trade amongst the parties involved emerges. The magnitude of the CO 2 cap determines the scarcity of rights. A major argument to introduce tradable emission rights, instead of, for instance, taxes, has been that "the invisible hand" of the market would lead to emission reduction by those who can achieve reduction at the lowest cost. In Europe, electricity generation accounts for one-third of CO 2 emissions; in the Netherlands this is more than 50% of the sectors under CET. Its success therefore depends on the emission reduction by power generation. This sector, however, has been liberalized, reregulated and privatized in the last decade. Today power generation is separated from transport and supply. Around Europe, autonomous companies decide on (dis)investment in power generation facilities.
Introduction
Under the Kyoto Protocol, governments agreed on and accepted CO 2 reduction targets in order to counter climate change (UNFCCC 1998) . In Europe one of the main policy instruments to meet these reduction targets is CO 2 emission-trading (CET), which was implemented as of January 2005 (Directive 2003 Europese Unie 2004) . In this system, companies active in specific sectors must be in the possession of CO 2 emission rights that equals the amount of CO 2 emitted (EnergieNed 2006) . Any surplus can be sold; any deficit must be compensated for by acquiring rights. Effectively, by economic pricing of CO 2 emission the external effects are partly internalized to the economy. By limiting the total amount of rights -the cap -the EU and its Members States must make sure a suitable price of rights is formed and trade amongst the parties involved emerges. The magnitude of the CO 2 cap determines the scarcity of rights. A major argument to introduce tradable emission rights, instead of, for instance, taxes, has been that "the invisible hand" of the market would lead to emission reduction by those who can achieve reduction at the lowest cost (Smith 1776; Svendsen 1999; Ehrhart et al. 2003; Svendsen & Vesterdal 2003) .
In Europe, electricity generation accounts for one-third of CO 2 emissions; in the Netherlands this is more than 50% of the sectors under CET (Cozijnsen 2005) . Its success therefore depends on the emission reduction by power generation. This sector, however, has been liberalized, reregulated and privatized in the last decade. Today power generation is separated from transport and supply. Around Europe, autonomous companies decide on (dis)investment in power generation facilities.
The central question in this paper is:

What long-term impact of CO 2 emission-trading on CO 2 emissions can be expected in electric power generation?
In this paper, the effect of CET on the emissions in electric power generation is quantified with an agentbased model. The paper is structured as follows. First, the background is presented as well as some notions on the perspective used in this paper. Next, the developed model is presented, including some remarks on its implementation. Consecutively, an analysis of the simulation results is presented. Finally, conclusions are drawn.
Background and perspective
The electricity sector has been liberalized in the last decade, unbundling power generation, transport and supply. Consecutively, the EU implemented an emission-trading scheme, by which electricity generating companies are obliged to have emission right to cover their emission.
A socio-technical systems-perspective is adopted to analyze this system (Ottens et al. 2006) . In this perspective, the technical system of electricity generation and emission-trading is distinguished from the social system. The technical subsystem contains physical apparatus, such as power generation facilities, electricity grids and consumer equipment, and laws of physics apply to this subsystem. The social subsystem contains actors, engaging in contracts with each other and owning and operating components of the physical subsystem, under social laws such as regulatory regimes. In Figure 2 an overview is given of the electricity generation system, including emission-trading, from a socio-technical perspective.
A limited number of companies are active in (large-scale) electric power generation: a tight oligopoly is in place (Vries 2004) . In the Netherlands, mainly facilities are in place using natural gas and coal. To a lesser extent other sources are used, such as nuclear, wind and biomass (EnergieNed 2006). In Table 1 , the main characteristics of the energy sources are stated.
CO 2 emissions are energy source dependent: coal is the most CO 2 intensive; gas is less CO 2 intensive and nuclear and wind CO 2 -free. Also biomass is counted as carbon-free, since only short-cycle carbon is used: the carbon uptake of the biomass chain equals the carbon emission and can therefore be ignored. Contrary to the carbon-intensity, the coal is a relatively cheap fuel compared to natural gas. Uranium can be acquired at even lower cost, if compared on an energy basis. Electricity is transported through a high voltage transport grid, owned and controlled by system operators. Medium voltage distribution grids are used locally. Households buy electricity from retail companies that are active on power markets in order to buy the contracted electricity. Some large industrial consumers buy their electricity on the market themselves. The main power market in the Netherlands is the bilateral market, on which 80% of the electricity is sold. The rest is sold on the spot market.
Although many incremental innovations drive-down the CO 2 intensity of electricity generation (in Mton CO 2 per kWh electricity produced), a total reduction of emission from the sector is hard to achieve. The demand for electricity has been rising 2% per year on average for the last decades, with increase in population and increase in energy-intensity of living standards as main reasons. Whilst the demand for electricity is relatively inelastic to changes in the price, the CO 2 intensity of electricity generation should decline significantly for an absolute decrease in emissions on the mid-long term. It may be seen therefore it is not implicit that through CET the sector's CO 2 emission would reduce dramatically.
The impact of CET on consumers is by affecting the bid prices of electricity suppliers. This impact is twofold. First, an increase in electricity prices leads to a decrease in demand. Since -especially on short term -demand is inelastic to price, this effect is little. Second, the attractiveness of suppliers shifts towards less CO 2 intensive electricity producers: since emissions are priced, CO 2 intensive producers are more expensive and therefore a less attractive supplier for consumers. Consequently, this impact does not lead to a decrease in demand. Because the operational flexibility of power plants is limited, CO 2 intensity of currently operating equipment cannot be decreased significant. Therefore, significant CO 2 reductions can be achieved in two ways:
• by a shift in the electric power generation portfolio (for instance by replacing coal based power plants by the use of natural gas, or by the diffusion of biomass power plants, replacing coal and/or natural gas based power plants); • by innovative technologies that have lower costs operational and lower CO 2 intensive power generation.
Although CET can increase the incentive to innovate, the development programs of those technologies are not directly influenced by CET. Consequently, the main impact of CET is on investment decisions by electricity producers and this paper focuses on that impact (see also Figure 3 ). 
Model development
To elucidate the impact of CET on the power generation sector's CO 2 emission an agent-based model (ABM) was built. An agent-based simulation model may be defined as "a collection of heterogeneous, intelligent, and interacting agents, which operate and exist in an environment, which in turn is made up of agents" (Epstein & Axtell 1996; Axelrod 1997 ). An ABM thus is a set of interacting 'agents' with certain properties. An agent is defined as "an agent is an encapsulated computer system that is situated in some environment and that is capable of flexible, autonomous action in that environment in order to meet its design objectives" (Jennings 2000) . Although in the literature different sets of properties for agents are proposed (Bussmann et al. 1998; Weiss 2000) , of which the core components are:
• a set of goals;
• a working memory;
• a social memory;
• a set of rules of social engagement.
Agents have goals and can take actions to reach those goals. The set of goals, are objectives of the agent that it wants to accomplish. The working memory of an agent is a set of information about itself, called the state. The social memory is a set of knowledge on the behaviour of the agent and other agents. Past actions and interactions build this memory. Social engagement rules define the social behaviour of an agent. It contains the abilities an agent has to interact with others or make decisions. In other words, an agent-based model is a simulation of the interaction of a set of agents over time that make decisions based on their goals, exogenous parameters and past interaction with other agents.
A schematic overview of the components of the agent-based model is presented in Figure 4 . Agentsmaking individual decisions -and technological installations make up the core of the model. The decisions of agents are made based on the parameter inputs. The system as a whole evolves based on the decisions of individual agents. After aggregation of results, the outcomes can be analyzed of behaviour of agents and system developments. The main agents in the model are autonomous power companies, of which six are modelled, each with a unique set of decision criteria to decide on their (dis)investment, production and sale of electricity. The (dis)investment decision is made in three steps:
• deciding what power plants should be dismantled;
• deciding if investing in a new power generation facility is needed;
• deciding which type of electricity generation plant is preferred.
Criteria for divesting are that the technical lifetime of existing power plants is reached and that for some time it is continuously found that marginal revenue cannot cover the marginal costs. Next, criteria for investment are that expiring capacity should be replaced or that there is need for capacity expansion. Consecutively, criteria for selection of electric power generation type include rational criteria, such as the lifetime cost-benefit but also irrational criteria, such as a dislike of nuclear power plants and conservativeness.
Other agents modelled include markets for electricity, fuels and CO 2 emission rights, the government and consumers. In the model electricity can be produced by the combustion of natural gas and coal. In addition, nuclear power and renewable resources can be used.
Power plants can be characterized by their fuel-type, costs, lifetime and fuel usage. In Table 2 , the main characteristics of the used power plants in the Netherlands are listed. For coal, two types are listed, a conventional coal fired steam power plant and a clean coal power plant in which the CO 2 emission is stored in an empty gas field. Only the last type of power plant is not yet proven technology, but seen as one of the most promising technologies (Task Force Energietransitie 2006) . Operational flexibility in power plants is limited. Since reductions by changes in existing power plants are assumed to be of limited impact, in the model emission reduction can only be realized by a shift in the power generation portfolio used. The agents' decisions are based on factors, not influenced by the model. Those factors are modelled as environment scenarios (Enserink et al. 2002) . Three driving forces are defined that have an effect on relevant and uncertain factors surrounding the agents, namely world economic growth, environment mindedness and external limitations. The factors influences include potential developments in fuel prices, electricity demand and changes in the cap. For all factors, data were collected for initial values and trends (Chappin 2006) , reported in Table 3 . The three scenario axis together build a scenario space -a cube -in which each point is represents set of values of trends, in other words, a scenario. A total of 9 scenarios are selected: all combinations of extremes on the axis and one in the centre of the scenario space (see Figure 5 ). Figure 5 . Scenario space An electricity market agent represents the daily APX spot market and the longer term bilateral contracts. Yearly output and prices are calculated based on yearly bids that power producers make for its installations and the yearly demand, import price and capacity and the aggregate demand by using the following formulas: 
Where s i is the actual supply of power plant i in MWh e /year, c i is the capacity power plant i in MWh e /year, p a,i is the actual price for power plant i in €/MWh e , p b,i is the bid for power plant i in €/MWh e , d is the total demand for electricity in MWh e /year and n is the number of power plants. Bids are based on marginal costs. Relatively low bids result in low electricity price and base load. Relatively high bids lead to a higher price and peak load. The electricity price is based on supply and demand, on the relative bid height and a correction factor to calibrate for real prices
The allocation scheme defines the amount of rights that are grandfathered per CO 2 emitting installation:
Where g i is the number of grandfathered rights for agent i in €/ton, t is the total cap in ton/year, r is the percentage of total rights that are grandfathered, e i is the actual emission by the installations of agent i in ton/year and m is the number of agents. The allocation scheme limits the total amount of rights -a cap-andtrade system -and the part of the total that is grandfathered. The available rights are divided amongst the electricity producing agents on basis of actual emissions. Prices are equal for all parties: 2 2 1 10 40
Where p CO2 is the price of CO 2 rights in €/ton, e j is the emission of power plant j in €/ton, n is the number of power plants and t is the total cap in ton/year. The price is based on ratio of supply and demand for emission rights and the total emission of the sector. The price is calibrated at a base price of 10 €/ton CO 2 and a price of 50 €/ton CO 2 when using of all domestic rights.
The model has been implemented using the ABM framework developed by Nikolic et al (Nikolic & Dijkema 2006; Nikolic et al. 2007) . A shared ontology -a formalized structure of concepts with a knowledge base -therein built in Protégé (Protégé 2006 ) was used to define the power companies as agents, their power producing facilities and the available technologies. The source code for the model was written in the integrated development environment, Eclipse (Eclipse 2006) in Java (Sun Microsystems 2006) . In addition, Repast was used as agent-based simulation tool (Repast 2006) . In order to obtain a robust image of CET-impact parameter sweeps over the entire scenario and parameter space were completed by running some 450 simulations. The results obtained were statistically analyzed by using SPSS (SPSS 2007) . In the analyses, no values of single runs were used, but average values over the scenario and parameter space. In Figure 6 an overview of the software tools in the ABM simulation engine framework is given. Figure 6 . Software tools in the ABM simulation engine framework
Since reductions by changes in existing power plants are assumed to be of limited impact, in the model emission reduction can only be realized by a shift in the power generation portfolio used. The sector will decrease its CO 2 intensity only if the implementation of CET leads to a shift in portfolio. Since electricity generation is liberalized, however, each electricity producer uses its own criteria to decide on their (dis)investments. In addition, it may be expected that the portfolio shifts only gradually, as power plants have a technical and economic lifespan measured in decades. Therefore, the attention in the outcomes goes -next to CO 2 emissions -to the changes in portfolio.
Model validation and simulation outcomes
Extensively validation was done during and after development of the model. Since for agent-based models no generally accepted validation methods are in the literature for validation of agent-based models many of the same tests developed for System Dynamics models are used, following Qudrat-Ullah (2005, page 2). Even a broader range of validating methods for System Dynamic Models is used than he suggested, where applicable, the tests are used that Barlas (1996) described. The executed tests include direct structure tests, such as tests on empirical structure and parameters, direct extreme conditions, boundary adequacy of structure, dimension analysis and face validation. Also structure oriented behaviour tests were successfully completed: tests for extreme conditions, qualitative future analysis, comparison with accepted theory and an extensive sensitivity analysis. After validation, over a thousand simulations are executed over the extensive scenario-space described earlier, each with a time period of 75 years. Initial conditions for all simulation runs are equal, but the modelled variation in scenarios and the modelled uncertainty leads to variation in the output. Also simulations were done in which emission-trading was not present. The simulation outcomes are statistically analyzed and aggregated to provide meaningful results.
The impact of CO 2 emission-trading on emissions is shown in Figure 7 . The emission reduction over time is depicted that is a consequence of the implementation of CET. A value of 25% for scenario x at year y means that when during the time up to year y CET was not implemented, the emissions by electric power generation would on average for scenario x by 25% higher. Each deviation from 0% is thus a consequence of CET. As shown, the impact in the first two decades is small: for some scenarios a reduction and for others an increase of up to 25% is noted. After that, a significant reduction is reached in most scenarios.
Reductions can reach even 80% on the long term. However, absolute emissions still rise under most scenarios, since total electricity demand rises.
In Figure 8 the composition of the electricity generation portfolio over time is displayed averaged over all scenarios and runs: this assumes that all scenarios have equal probabilities to actually occur. In the graph, the brightest colours show the developments under the emission-trading system. Also the developments are Figure 8 . The average impact of CO 2 emission-trading on developments in portfolio composition drawn in a system where emission-trading is absent: in dotted lines and faded colours. An impact is clearly shown: developments in the composition of the electric power generation portfolio differ. In the first decades the impact is minimal: current standing installations are not replaced until the physical lifetime has passed and electric power producers just accept the costs for CO 2 rights. Even the current run for natural gas power plants is slowed down. After the first decades, a shift is noted towards coal, although its emission-intensity is highest of all. However, the shift to coal would be even stronger without emissiontrading. Renewable sources are used more, but power producers withhold to adopt them significantly, even on the long term. The effect of CET is thus not strong enough.
As was mentioned, unique sets of investment decision criteria were selected for six electric power producer agents in the model. At this moment, the criteria are fixed within and between runs. The examples in Figure  9 show that the portfolios of the agents develop differently, although on average coming from equal initial portfolio compositions. It was found that electricity producer 3 had the highest power generation capacity at all times and was also most profitable. Since this producer is in the model the largest emitter-since it uses the most coal of all agents and only little amounts of renewable sources -and the most profitable (!) it is not likely that emission trading has a strong enough price-signal to generate a total shift, especially since in reality decision criteria might change over time towards the criteria of the more successful power producers.
Conclusions and implications
The impact of CET on emissions by Dutch power production and its generation portfolio is relatively small and late: absolute emissions by electricity generation rise under most scenarios. On the longer term a shift towards coal is found, driven by low coal costs and an increase in electricity demand. From these results it should not be interpreted that the presented portfolio developments will be most likely to occur. Large differences between scenarios are found, technological innovation will drive down fixed and/or variable costs for alternatives and new alternatives might be developed, new power producers can come to the market and existing can merge or adapt their strategies. However, a model incorporating those issues is on the research agenda and might give more concrete insight in developments of the power generation portfolio.
The findings correspond to the dominant part of current capacity expansions plans in the Netherlands and Germany. An overview of plans for new power plants in these two countries is given in Table 4 , calculated per fuel type. For some coal power plants planned for the Netherlands it is possible to co-fire biomass with the coal (the figures are calculated with a maximum of 15% co-fired, on basis of energy). In the Netherlands, in the coming years much capacity for natural gas will become operational. However, starting from 2010, large coal power plants are planned -modernized, but still the most CO 2 intensive option Figure 9 . Portfolio developments of individual electric power producers available -amounts probably exceeding the natural gas capacity planned (46-52% of total planned capacity). In Germany this is even worse: 68% of their plans are to build coal power plants. This equals 30 GW e which corresponds to 1½ times the Dutch capacity at this moment. Also in the UK, the first coal power plant in 20 years is planned for after 2010 (The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2007). It seems surprising that even after the introduction of CET current power generation capacity expansion plans indicate a preference for coal. Apparently the economic effect of CO 2 emission-trading is not sufficient to outweigh the incentives to choose for coal. As also comes out of the model, such a shift is not easily reversed: power plants have lifetimes of decades. 
